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In the sixth month of 1866, a peculiar battle took 
place outside the village of Ōno, as this hamlet 
located on the border between Chōshū and Hiro-
shima domains suddenly became center stage for 
the opening act of Chōshū’s rebellion against the 
Tokugawa shogunate. Although this battle may 
have seemed unremarkable when compared to the 
more dramatic events of the campaign, it stood out 
for two reasons. First, the day’s fighting ended 
with a Tokugawa victory—a rare event in the war 
that ultimately toppled the shogunate. But the bat-
tle was remarkable in another respect: during at 
least one point in the firefight, neither of the forces 
engaged was composed of hereditary warriors.1  
To grapple with the deteriorating political cli-
mate of the 1860s, the shogunate and a number of 
domains used the inherent flexibility of the Toku-
gawa status system to recruit front-line soldiers 
who were not of warrior status. During the shogun-
ate’s 1866 war against Chōshū domain, peasant 
conscripts from the Kantō region formed the back-
bone of the Tokugawa army. Many of these com-
moner soldiers were veterans who had seen service 
in Mito domain during the shogunate’s suppression 
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1 This essay uses the term “warrior” to refer 
collectively to men who could claim some status as 
arms-bearers, and “samurai” to refer only to the 
high-ranking “full samurai” (士) who might enjoy 
drastically different privileges, responsibilities, and 
compensation from lower-ranking ashigaru (足軽), 
or foot soldiers, and warrior menials (武家奉公人) 
like chūgen (中間), who performed a wide variety 
of tasks. 
of the Tengū Insurrection in 1864. By the same 
token, Chōshū forces consisted primarily of several 
hundred troopers from the famous mixed units, or 
shotai (諸隊), many of which permitted warriors 
and commoners to serve side-by-side; they also 
included between three and four infantry compa-
nies composed of outcastes. Beginning in 1865, 
Chōshū’s leaders recruited more than four hundred 
outcastes to serve in the ranks of the mixed units. 
This decision demonstrated the lengths to which 
Chōshū was willing to go in order to maximize its 
available manpower. Of the domains that made 
major military recruitment efforts, it appears that 
only Chōshū organized all-outcaste combat units.2  
While the domain’s decision to employ outcastes 
as fighting men was unparalleled at the time, the 
experience of outcaste soldiers was in many ways 
typical of the men caught up in the military re-
forms of the Restoration era, whether those men 
were menial warriors, peasants, townsmen, or out-
castes. The military reform efforts conducted by 
the shogunate and several domains during the 
1860s sought to widen the pool of available man-
power by recruiting men on the social margins. 
From the perspective of those in power, warrior 
menials and commoners, among others, represent-
ed a more pliable option than the warriors in the 
shogunal and domain armies because they lacked a 
vested interest in the organizational status quo. For 
higher-ranking warriors, on the other hand, rank 
and unit affiliation were more than occupational 
concerns; they also determined warriors’ position 
within the retainer band. As such, the reform of 
existing military organizations portended a poten-
tially serious restructuring of the warrior elite—
one that domain authorities were eager to avoid.  
Chōshū’s auxiliary units have received signifi-
cantly more scholarly attention than other experi-
ments undertaken in this era of widespread military 
reform. Historians of the Bakumatsu era in particu-
lar have treated the shotai as a microcosm of the 
motivations at work within Chōshū in the 1860s, 
and by extension, in the Meiji Restoration. This 
perspective pervaded the work of prominent post-
                                                   
2 Inoue Kiyoshi provides a valuable overview 
of a variety of efforts to recruit commoners during 
the Bakumatsu era. Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon no 
gunkokushugi (Tokyo: Gendai Hyōronsha, 1975), 
1:98-139.  
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war Marxist scholars like Tōyama Shigeki and In-
oue Kiyoshi, who argued (albeit along different 
lines from one another) that the genesis of the 
shotai provided a window into the tensions and 
contradictions that would characterize the modern 
Japanese state.3 They were thus much more likely 
to concur with E.H. Norman in viewing units like 
Chōshū’s Kiheitai (奇兵隊) as a bridge to the 
modern Japanese military:  
 
The Kiheitai of Chōshū…. is an interest-
ing transitional type, containing in it the 
seeds of the armies of the early Meiji era, 
when all four classes were regarded as 
equal in status and when the government 
army recruited from all four classes rout-
ed the old samurai armies of feudal reac-
tion…4 
 
This point is echoed in Edward Drea’s recent 
history of the modern Japanese army, which also 
views the shotai as the primary progenitors of the 
modern Japanese army. 5  For these scholars, 
                                                   
3 For Tōyama and E.H. Norman, mixed-status 
units like the Kiheitai represented a domainal effort 
to co-opt the revolutionary energy of the 
peasantry—an approach continued by the Meiji 
government in the years after the Restoration. 
Later Marxist scholars approached the issue 
differently. Inoue Kiyoshi—and later, Tanaka 
Akira— viewed the shotai as products of a 
"middle-class ethno-nationalist" (中間層民族主
義) movement, in which low-ranking warriors and 
well-to-do commoners partnered with one another 
for the cause of barbarian expulsion. Both of these 
scholars also viewed the shotai as essentially 
transitional, incorporating both progressive and 
“feudal” elements. 
4 E.H. Norman, Soldier and Peasant in Japan: 
The Origins of Conscription (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia, 1965), 30. 
5  Edward Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its 
Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2009), 1-9. Although Drea does 
treat the Kiheitai as a point of origin for the 
modern Japanese army, his critical analysis of its 
military capabilities represents a welcome 
Chōshū’s recruitment of commoners and the later 
prominence of shotai officers in the Meiji officer 
corps create an inviting point of connection. 
Other historians, however, have questioned the 
putatively progressive character of units like the 
Kiheitai. For instance, Albert Craig’s classic study 
of Chōshū’s role in the Restoration emphasized the 
allegedly “feudal” characteristics of the shotai, 
arguing that they “were organized as an emergency 
measure, not as a new type of unit favored by sem-
irevolutionary leaders.…” 6  Craig’s work shed 
much-needed light on the composition and internal 
dynamics of the shotai, but was more occupied 
with negating the Marxist appraisals of the signifi-
cance of the shotai than elucidating their signifi-
cance within the context of the domain’s military 
reforms. Much like his Marxist antagonists, Craig 
viewed Chōshū’s initiatives as sui generis.  
More recent scholarship has attempted to move 
away from the debate about the place of the shotai 
in the Meiji Restoration and the consequent privi-
leging of Chōshū’s role in it. Hōya Tōru, for in-
stance, agrees with Craig’s characterization of the 
shotai as essentially feudal, but argues that an in-
ordinate emphasis on the role of these plucky aux-
iliaries distracts from the broader picture of mili-
tary reforms in Chōshū and completely effaces the 
significance of efforts conducted in other domains 
and in Edo. Hōya advocates focusing on hitherto 
underexplored aspects of the Chōshū’s military 
reforms, such as the reorganization of the domain’s 
foot soldiers, warrior menials, and rear vassals (陪
臣) into rifle companies, if only for the simple rea-
son that these units did most of the domain’s 
fighting in the 1868-1869 Boshin War.7   
While Hōya is right to note that an overempha-
sis on the significance of certain shotai has led to a 
limited perspective on the character of Chōshū’s 
military reforms, it is not necessary to go beyond 
the domain—or even the shotai—to validate his 
                                                                             
departure from the often-laudatory assessments of 
its performance. 
6 Albert Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 280.  
7 Hōya Tōru, “Bakumatsu Ishin no dōran to 
gunsei kaikaku,” in Takahashi Noriyuki, Yamada 
Kuniaki, Hōya Tōru, and Ichinose Toshiya, Nihon 
gunjishi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2006), 
288-290.  
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point. By juxtaposing the Kiheitai with the Ishin-
dan (維新団), an all-outcaste unit organized in 
1865—and one unit among many in a broad-based 
military reform effort that incorporated hunters, 
Shinto priests, outcastes, and other liminal status 
groups—it becomes evident that the domain’s mili-
tary reforms were intended primarily to use the 
inherent flexibility of the status system to address 
manpower needs in wartime, and were thus not 
aimed at implementing a more egalitarian vision of 
military service. In this respect, while the outward 
appearance of Chōshū’s military reforms seemed 
to distinguish the domain from its contemporaries, 
it had far more in common with the other reformist 
polities of the era than is typically acknowledged.8  
This essay aims to connect scholarship on mili-
tary reform with the resurgence of interest in the 
status system. Recent works of historical scholar-
ship have advanced a more nuanced understanding 
of the fundamental—and often complex—role of 
status in Tokugawa society, which “… permeated 
and shaped virtually every aspect of the social for-
mation…”9 While earlier conceptions of the status 
system stressed its supposedly static and quadripar-
tite character, a notion echoed in Tokugawa-period 
Neo-Confucian discourse, the situation on the 
ground was often significantly more complex. 
More often than not, occupation rather than heredi-
ty determined where individuals fit into the status 
hierarchy; thus, changes in occupation could allow 
individuals to achieve a small measure of social 
mobility, though this was often only temporary.10 
The warrior estate was no exception. In Chōshū, 
while some men of menial chūgen status had he-
reditary rank, many others who were employed in 
the domain’s provincial administration were com-
                                                   
8  For instance, a number of domains—
including Mito, Obama, Kokura, Tosa, Geishū 
(Hiroshima), and Chōshū—organized commoner 
militias for coastal defense. However, although 
some of these units saw combat, many were little 
more than ill-equipped neighborhood watch 
organizations. Inoue, 98-112. 
9 Daniel Botsman, Punishment and Power in 
the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 59. 
10 David Howell, Geographies of Identity in 
Nineteenth-Century Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 34. 
moners, and the terms of their employment dif-
fered little from that of paid laborers.11 
When military recruiting became a pressing 
concern in the 1860s, the shogunate and reformist 
domains were able to use the flexibility in the sta-
tus system to their benefit, as they promised volun-
teers a range of status-based incentives for enlist-
ing. In Tokugawa vassal lands (旗本知行地) in the 
Kantō region, peasants answered the shogunate’s 
call for conscripts not only for the signing bonus, 
but also for the prospect of promotion to menial 
warrior status.12 In Chōshū, commoner volunteers 
were often permitted to comport themselves as 
warriors by exercising the right to surname and 
sword (名字帯刀) for the duration of their service. 
Outcastes who enlisted were promised a similarly 
status-appropriate reward: the legal abrogation of 
their status (穢多之名目被差除).13  Temporary 
status promotion was also a common recruitment 
tool in domains that did not anticipate using com-
moners in front-line service. Mito, Hiroshima, To-
sa, and Wakayama domains, for instance, created 
peasant militias charged with coastal defense; their 
militiamen were permitted the right to surname and 
sword while on duty.14 In this respect, Satsuma, 
despite its reputation as a reformist domain, proved 
(as usual) to be a significant exception to the trends 
of military reform. Rather than seek new sources of 
manpower, the domain simply mobilized its large 
population of rusticated warriors (郷士 or 外城士), 
many of whom made their actual livelihood as ag-
riculturalists, but who outnumbered castle warriors 
by a ten-to-one margin.15  
                                                   
11  Morishita Tōru, “Chūgen,” in Shokunin, 
oyakata, nakama, ed. Tsukada Takashi, Shirīzu 
kinsei no mibunteki shūen 3 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan, 2000), 154-187.  
12 “Heifu kaitei no fure,” in Rikugun rekishi, ed. 
Katsu Kaishū, Katsu Kaishū zenshū 13 (Tokyo: 
Kōdansha, 1974), 3:341-342. 
13  “Kaki no uchi kyōsō no mono ra senjō 
makari ide sashimenji no koto,” in Yamaguchi-ken 
shi shiryō-hen bakumatsu ishin, ed. Yamaguchi-
ken (Yamaguchi: Yamaguchi-ken, 2000), 6:50. 
14 Inoue, 99-104.  
15  Kagoshima-ken, ed., Kagoshima-ken shi, 
(Kagoshima: Kagoshima-ken, 1967) 3:119-120. A 
1756 census put the castle warrior population at 
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When viewed in this light, late-Tokugawa mili-
tary reforms that led to the creation of non-
traditional units were more often than not stopgap 
measures—not intentional repudiations of the sta-
tus system. As the military crisis surrounding the 
1868 Meiji Restoration began to abate, outcaste 
and commoner volunteers were the first to be dis-
banded. Moreover, the temporary social advance-
ment secured by individual soldiers was soon ef-
faced by the legal abolition of status distinctions in 
the early Meiji period. Simply put, while the 
stretching of status boundaries greatly facilitated 
the shogunate and domains’ ability to carry out 
military reforms, the apparent social mobility of-
fered to volunteers was transitory in most cases 
and largely illusory in many others, as in the case 
of Chōshū’s outcaste soldiers.  
 
Military Reform in the Bakumatsu Era 
  
The inclusion of commoners and outcastes in 
the ranks of late Tokugawa military units was a 
consequence of a half-century of heightened con-
cern for the protection of shogunal and domainal 
territory from foreign incursion. For most of the 
eighteenth century, military concerns had remained 
peripheral for both central and regional authorities 
in Japan. However, the situation changed as Euro-
American imperial powers began expanding their 
reach into East Asia. Beginning in the late eight-
eenth century, scholars like Hayashi Shihei urged 
the shogunate and domains to strengthen coastal 
defense (海防). The point was driven home by the 
infamous Phaeton incident of 1808, when the 
eponymous British frigate raided the Dutch factory 
in Nagasaki. After infiltrating the harbor under 
Dutch colors, the British abducted two of the 
Dutch traders and extorted provisions from local 
officials. The incident so embarrassed the officials 
charged with the port’s security that the Nagasaki 
magistrate committed ritual suicide. In the wake of 
the Phaeton debacle, the shogunate and southwest-
ern coastal domains—especially Fukuoka and Saga, 
who were charged with the security of Nagasaki 
harbor—expended a great deal of effort and re-
                                                                             
3,500, and country warriors at around 35,000. Ki-
mura Motoi, Fujino Tamotsu, and Murakami Tada-
shi, ed., Hanshi daijiten (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 
1988), 7:548. 
sources to upgrade existing coastal artillery batter-
ies and construct new ones.16 Concerns over de-
fense intensified in the two decades following the 
First Opium War (1840-1842) between Great Brit-
ain and Qing-dynasty China, as efforts to strength-
en coastal defense were subsumed under the rubric 
of military reform (軍政改革).  
Although shogunal and domainal authorities 
continued to concern themselves with the construc-
tion of shore batteries, their attention began to turn 
to the creation of new kinds of military units capa-
ble of deploying updated weaponry in battle. In 
most cases, reform efforts took place with the 
guidance of instructors associated with Takashima-
ryū (高島流) musketry and gunnery (砲術), a puta-
tively “Western” style that incorporated Dutch 
flintlock muskets, artillery, and tactics in its les-
sons, whereas most contemporary schools contin-
ued to stress the use of older matchlock muskets.  
Although influential Takashima-ryū instructors 
eagerly conflated their school with Dutch military 
science—to the point of encouraging its designa-
tion as “the Western School” (西洋流)—its peda-
gogy changed regularly and often significantly in 
the twenty years between the school’s founding in 
the 1830s and the tumultuous 1860s. What began 
as a local offshoot of more traditional Ogino-ryū 
(荻野流 ) musketry eventually morphed into a 
widely patronized school dedicated to advancing 
Westernizing military reforms. An 1841 demon-
stration before the senior councilors (老中) proved 
impressive enough that the shogunate not only 
permitted Takashima-ryū instructors to seek do-
mainal patrons, but also took steps toward patron-
izing the school on its own.17  
During the 1840s, most efforts to adopt Ta-
kashima-ryū as the basis for far-reaching military 
reforms met with failure. Would-be reformers 
found themselves in conflict with those who stood 
to lose from change—particularly Japanese mus-
                                                   
16 Noell Wilson, “Tokugawa Defense Redux: 
Organizational Failure in the Phaeton Incident of 
1808,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 36:1 (Win-
ter 2010), 27-30.  
17 “Takashima Shirōdayū denrai no hōjutsu wo, 
Egawa Tarōzaemon ni denju subeki wo meizu,” 
Katsu, 1:55-56. “Takashima-ryū kajutsu shoka 
denju kurushikarazu no shirei,” in Ibid., 1:73-74.  
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ketry schools (和流) that feared a loss of influence 
as a result of the move towards Western-style drill 
with flintlock muskets, instead of the traditional 
emphasis on individual marksmanship. 18  In 
Chōshū, for instance, warriors who had trained 
under Takashima-ryū instructors advocated its 
adoption, but the domain made no official move to 
patronize the school.19 However, after the shogun-
ate’s embarrassing failure to present a credible mil-
itary threat during the visit of American Commo-
dore Matthew Perry in 1854, Takashima-ryū en-
joyed a resurgence in popularity. The shogunate 
charged Takashima-ryū instructors with re-training 
bannermen (旗本) and housemen (御家人) at its 
new Martial Arts Academy (講武所 ) in Edo. 
Chōshū authorities sent dozens of men to study 
under Takashima-ryū instructors in Edo and Naga-
saki. In 1859, Yamada Matasuke, one of the do-
main’s high-ranking officials, recommended the 
complete reorganization of the retainer band into 
Western-style infantry companies. 20  But in 
Chōshū, as elsewhere in Tokugawa Japan, warri-
ors’ rank and affiliation represented more than 
their role in the domain army; it also defined their 
status within the retainer band. For many within 
the domain, Yamada’s proposal was a bridge too 
far; vehement opposition forced the daimyō, Mōri 
Takachika, to order the abandonment of any radi-
cal restructuring. A similar fate soon befell the 
shogunate’s Martial Arts Academy. In 1858, an 
inspector (目付) charged with reviewing the acad-
emy offered a rather critical assessment of warri-
ors’ enthusiasm for Western drill, and by 1860 
Japanese musketry and archery instructors had el-
bowed their way into the curriculum, where they 
held a great deal of influence until the Bunkyū 
(1861-1864) military reforms.21  
                                                   
18 After the 1841 Takashima-ryū demonstration, 
one waryū musketry instructor wrote a scathing 
commentary that dismissed close order drill—as 
opposed to the individual marksmanship 
competitions that Japanese schools stressed—as 
“children’s games” (童子戯). Katsu, 1:38. 
19 Suematsu Kenchō, Bōchō kaitenshi (Reprint, 
Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1967), 1:82. 
20 Ibid., 1:204-210. 
21  “Kōbushogakari kansatsu no kenpaku,” 
Katsu, 3:231-234; “Kōbusho okite,” Ibid., 3:259-
In the early 1860s, military reforms moved be-
yond early Takashima-ryū efforts to introduce new 
technology and techniques into existing units, and 
into thoroughgoing attempts to create Western-
style rifle companies. On one hand, these efforts 
were partly a reflection of the deteriorating domes-
tic political situation. As domains competed with 
one another and the shogunate for the attentions of 
a politically revitalized imperial court, open con-
flict between two or more parties became increas-
ingly likely. On the other hand, the military re-
forms conducted by the shogunate and reformist 
domains like Satsuma and Chōshū were also 
prompted by foreign considerations. For the sho-
gunate, then under the leadership of Fukui daimyō 
Matsudaira Shungaku, the decision to create a 
Western-style force composed largely of peasant 
conscripts was motivated by a desire to have not 
only a force capable of subduing domestic oppo-
nents, but also one that could bolster Tokugawa 
legitimacy in the eyes of foreign powers.22 For 
Chōshū, the military reforms that led to the crea-
tion of non-warrior units were the direct result of 
engagements between the domain and Western 
nations.  
 
New Wars, New Soldiers 
  
Chōshū fought a number of small engagements 
with European and American naval detachments 
between 1863 and 1864, as imperial loyalists with-
in the domain government seized upon a foreigner 
expulsion edict (攘夷令) issued by the Kyoto court 
in late 1862 that the shogunate had mistakenly re-
garded as pro forma. In three separate incidents 
during the summer of 1863, Chōshū’s coastal bat-
teries fired upon foreign ships traveling through the 
Shimonoseki Straits. Reprisals by American and 
French naval vessels annihilated Chōshū’s fledg-
ling navy and routed the men manning its coastal 
batteries. 23  This display of unpreparedness 
                                                                             
260. The revamped curriculum even included inu-
oumono (犬追物), or archery practice on moving 
canine targets.  
22 Conrad Totman, The Collapse of The Toku-
gawa Bakufu, 1862-1868 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1980), 21-31. 
23 Furukawa Kaoru, Bakumatsu Chōshū han no 
jōi sensō: Ōbei rengō kantai no shūrai, Chūkō 
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shocked domain authorities into action. Soon after 
the French attack on Chōshū’s shore batteries the 
domain recalled Takasugi Shinsaku from internal 
exile and appointed him to the command of the 
defenses along the Shimonoseki Straits. Takasugi 
came from a high-ranking samurai family and had 
studied both at the domain school, the Meirinkan 
(明倫館), as well as Yoshida Shōin’s school, the 
Shōka Sonjuku (松下村塾). In 1862, Takasugi had 
received domain permission to travel to Shanghai, 
where he witnessed firsthand the powerlessness of 
Qing authorities at the hands of Western empires 
and Taiping rebels. The experience made him a 
convert to the anti-foreign cause, and he engaged 
in a variety of anti-Tokugawa and anti-foreign ac-
tivities before his return to Chōshū and exile in 
1863.  
While some accounts of the Kiheitai’s creation 
paint Takasugi as a visionary, the unit is best un-
derstood as one of many auxiliary forces designed 
to augment the domain army’s capability during a 
time of crisis. As Takasugi’s petition to the domain 
government put it:  
 
There are [two kinds] of soldiers: regulars 
and irregulars. There are [two kinds] of bat-
tles: [battles of] deception, and [battles of] 
truth. One can secure victory by knowing 
one’s force. Regulars face the enemy with 
massive force—they meet truth with truth. 
Units like the eight divisions (八組) led by 
the chief magistrate (総奉行) are regulars. 
What we want to organize is [a unit] that 
will penetrate the gaps in the enemy masses, 
harassing them by disappearing and reap-
pearing as if by magic (神出鬼没). Because 
they will use unorthodox methods to secure 
victory, they will be called the Irregulars 
(kiheitai 奇兵隊).24  
 
Takasugi went on to state that his Kiheitai would 
welcome volunteers regardless of rank, but with 
language specifically describing the recruitment of 
                                                                             
shinsho 1285 (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1996), 46-
47, 51. 
24 Suematsu, 1:454. The title of the Kiheitai 
refers to Sunzi’s distinction between “regular” (sei) 
and “irregular” (ki) forces.   
warriors, noting that they would be selected “with-
out distinguishing between rear vassals, foot sol-
diers, or domain samurai (陪臣軽卒藩士を不選同
様相交り).”25 The petition made no specific men-
tion of recruiting commoners, let alone outcastes.  
While several accounts of Bakumatsu-era 
Chōshū portray the Kiheitai as the direct anteced-
ent of the conscript army of Meiji, it is better un-
derstood as a warrior auxiliary unit that incorpo-
rated progressively larger numbers of common-
ers.26 The initial decision to permit the recruitment 
of commoners was motivated partly by Takasugi’s 
desire to secure the financial backing of wealthy 
Shimonoseki merchants like Shiraishi Sei’ichirō. 
Many of the earliest commoner volunteers were 
men of mercantile background connected to Shirai-
shi and his confederates.27 Although commoners 
eventually made up more than half of the Kiheitai, 
they most likely accounted for fewer than one-third 
of the unit’s troopers through the end of 1864.28 
The percentage of commoners serving in the ranks 
increased significantly in early 1865 when the Ki-
heitai and other mixed units conscripted peasants 
in their rebellion against conservatives in the do-
main government. However, the seemingly egali-
tarian recruiting procedures of the Kiheitai did not 
extend to outcastes, who were not permitted to join 
at any point in the unit’s six-year existence. In fact, 
in an 1865 letter to two of his junior officers, Ōta 
Ichinoshin and Yamagata Aritomo, Takasugi ad-
vocated excluding outcastes “for the time being.”29 
While the letter does not reveal the logic behind 
this decision, Tejima Kazuo has argued that Ta-
kasugi may have viewed outcastes as less than ful-
ly Japanese, and thus a hindrance to achieving the 
                                                   
25 Ibid.  
26 Norman, 30.  
27 Tanaka Akira, Takasugi Shinsaku to Kiheitai, 
Iwanami shinsho no Edo jidai (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1993), 102-106. 
28 Craig, 270-281.  
29 Tejima Kazuo, “Kiheitai ni okeru ‘eta’ gunji 
tōyō no igi: Takasugi Shinsaku no kyōheiron,” 
Buraku mondai kenkyū, no. 111 (May 1995), 58. In 
fact, the Sharpshooters (狙撃隊 ) summarily 
executed a shrine attendant (宮番)—also outcastes 
in Chōshū—for attempting to join the unit while 
pretending to be a peasant. 
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ethnic unity he thought would be necessary for 
dealing effectively with foreign powers.30 
Despite the prominent position of the Kiheitai 
in many narratives of the Bakumatsu era, it was 
only one of a dozen similar units.31 Domain au-
thorities granted Takasugi permission to form the 
Kiheitai in the sixth month of 1863. At that time, 
they also allowed the creation of several other vol-
unteer auxiliary units. At nearly five hundred 
men—to the Kiheitai’s three hundred—the largest 
of these was the Yūgekitai (遊撃隊), later known 
as the Yūgekigun (遊撃軍), which had originally 
been created to accompany the domain heir on a 
procession to Kyoto. Composed largely of menial 
warriors such as chūgen and ashigaru, the 
Yūgekitai became an umbrella unit for several 
smaller outfits. Many of these units were formed 
on a voluntary basis by liminal status groups: a 
group of ikkō Buddhist monks formed the Vajra 
Platoon (金剛隊); a group of Shintō priests formed 
the Divine Power Platoon (神威隊); a group of 
fifty wrestlers formed the Brave Wrestler Platoon 
(勇力隊), which was at one time commanded by 
Itō Hirobumi; and a small group of hunters formed 
a unit of sharpshooters.32 For the most part, how-
ever, each of these units furnished fewer than fifty 
fighting men.  
Whether dealing with warriors, commoners, or 
Buddhist monks, domain authorities took great 
pains to minimize any potential social disruptions. 
The mixed unit regulations issued in the twelfth 
month of 1863 imposed stringent restrictions on 
the enlistment of samurai men. Heads of household 
(本人) and heirs (嫡子) from high-ranking house-
holds were only permitted to enlist if they received 
express permission from shotai commanders. 
                                                   
30 Ibid., 76-78. 
31 Tanaka, appendix 2. According to Tanaka 
Akira’s estimate, the Kiheitai accounted for just 
one-quarter of Chōshū auxiliaries at its high-water 
mark in the twelfth month of 1863. After major 
military reforms were undertaken in 1865, the 
Kiheitai’s size declined precipitously relative to the 
domain’s overall manpower.  
32 “Kijima Matabei, Kusaka Yoshisuke [Gen-
zui], jōkyō otomo ni tsuki yūgekitai toritate 
ōsetsuke no koto,” in Yamaguchi-ken shi shiryō-
hen bakumatsu ishin, 6:76.  
Samurai serving in the domain army were allowed 
to join up provided that they found suitable substi-
tutes for themselves. The same scrutiny extended 
to commoners. Only peasants and townsmen who 
had no domestic or occupational responsibilities 
were permitted to enlist in the mixed units. 33 
However, as the “examination” (詮議) intended to 
verify the status of commoners consisted of a sin-
gle short form to be completed by a town magis-
trate (町奉行) or rural intendant (代官), it seems 
likely that any clever commoner could talk his way 
into one of the shotai.  
Not all of the auxiliary units created by Chōshū 
were composed of marginal men and relations be-
tween units were sometimes tense. The Vanguards 
(先鋒隊 ) consisted entirely of volunteers from 
among the ranks of the high-ranking mounted war-
riors who formed the daimyō’s bodyguard (馬廻). 
As these men lacked any significant status-based 
incentive for volunteering, it is possible that politi-
cal factionalism within the domain—in this case, 
the desire not to be outdone by the loyalist-leaning 
Kiheitai—led high-ranking samurai to join another 
unit, the Senpōtai.34 Unlike the troopers in the Ki-
heitai and the Yūgekitai, the all-samurai Senpōtai 
was only obligated to obey orders from the domain 
elders. And unlike many of the other mixed units, 
they were not required to train in Western-style 
infantry tactics. In other words, their chain of 
command never overlapped with those of any other 
mixed units. Relations between the Senpōtai and 
other less pedigreed units were rocky from the start. 
Tensions finally boiled over in the eighth month of 
1863, when the Kiheitai and Senpōtai engaged in a 
drunken brawl during a visit by the domain’s 
heir.35 It appeared that not all of the warrior troop-
ers in Chōshū’s auxiliary units were enthusiastic 
about fighting next to commoners. 
 
Recruiting Outcastes 
  
In the same year that Chōshū permitted the cre-
ation of the Kiheitai and other mixed units, Yo-
                                                   
33 “Yūgekitai sono hoka shotai kisoku, ninzū 
sadame no koto,” in Yamaguchi-ken shi shiryō-hen 
bakumatsu ishin, 6:87-89. 
34 Craig, 209. 
35 Tanaka, 23-27.  
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shida Toshimaro (Eitarō), a minor official in the 
domain’s administration, proposed tapping a hith-
erto unexploited pool of manpower: outcastes. To-
shimaro was born into a low-ranking foot soldier 
household. In fact, the family’s status was so low 
that one of his patrons in the domain government 
once derisively referred to him as “the gatekeeper’s 
kid” (門番の子).36 At the age of sixteen, he en-
rolled at the Shōka Sonjuku of Yoshida Shōin (no 
relation), where he met the men who would later 
lead the domain in its rebellion against the shogun-
ate, including Maebara Issei, Yamagata Aritomo, 
and Itō Hirobumi. In fact, Toshimaro earned a 
place among the so-called “Four Heavenly Kings” 
(四天王) of Shōin’s school, a group that included 
Takasugi Shinsaku, Kusaka Genzui, and Iriye Kui-
chi.  
In early 1863, Toshimaro sent a proposal to the 
domain government advocating the recruitment of 
outcaste soldiers for military service. Volunteers 
would be rewarded with the legal abrogation of 
their outcaste status. The date of the petition’s 
composition is unclear; however, according to 
Nunobiki Toshio, the leading historian of Chōshū’s 
outcaste military units, it was likely composed 
sometime between the third and fifth months of 
1863—before the formation of the Kiheitai. 37 
While the original text of the memorial is no longer 
extant, in a subsequent letter Toshimaro recom-
mended the recruitment of outcastes for two rea-
sons. First, they represented a more reliable source 
of manpower than masterless warriors (浪人) and 
other transients (浮食之徒 ). Second, recruiting 
outcastes instead of peasants would prevent disrup-
tion of the agricultural base of the domain.38 Both 
                                                   
36  Nunobiki Toshio, Chōshū-han Ishindan: 
Meiji Ishin no suiheijiku (Osaka: Kaihō Shup-
pansha, 2009), 54. 
37 Ibid., 62-66. Nunobiki’s work represents the 
most complete appraisal of the Ishindan and other 
outcaste units. However, it is primarily concerned 
with the significance of these units vis-à-vis the 
outcaste community in Chōshū, and less occupied 
with their place in the history of military reform 
and the status system.  
38  “Toyū toritate ni kansuru Yoshida Eitarō 
shokan danpen,” in Nunobiki, Chōshū-han Ishin-
dan, 184-187. 
of these points make it clear that Toshimaro saw 
the recruitment of outcaste soldiers as a means of 
augmenting the domain’s military power without 
undermining its economic and social stability.  
The domain government responded positively 
to Toshimaro’s recommendation. In the seventh 
month of 1863, Toshimaro was given a temporary 
promotion to higher rank (士御雇) and responsibil-
ity for overseeing the recruitment of outcaste sol-
diers with an eye toward using them in the field.39 
Just three days later, the Yamaguchi town magis-
trate issued a call for volunteers to outcaste com-
munities both within the town and in villages 
throughout the domain.40 The document began by 
referencing Chōshū’s enforcement of the imperial 
expulsion order, then moved quickly into a call for 
soldiers—a not-so-subtle suggestion that outcastes 
who volunteered on the domain’s behalf would see 
front-line service against its foreign enemies. 
Young men from outcaste communities were to be 
recruited up to a maximum of five men per one 
hundred homes; recruitment beyond this total was 
strictly forbidden. The pronouncement listed four 
criteria that potential volunteers would be required 
to meet: strength (強壮), bravery (勇気), agility 
(早道), and quick wits (才知). Those who served 
the domain faithfully would earn the right to com-
port themselves as menial warriors by wearing 
warrior over-garments (胴服) and a single short 
sword; they could also earn abrogation of their 
outcaste status (穢多之名目被差除).41  
But the call for volunteers provided no detail as 
to how the post-service abrogation of outcastes’ 
legal status would be carried out, posing a potential 
problem for domain authorities and the outcastes 
themselves. Shedding the derogatory label of “out-
caste” may have represented a step forward, but it 
meant little in practice if emancipated individuals 
remained in their communities and plied the same 
trades. The rewards outlined in the pronouncement 
suggest that the domain may have planned to or-
ganize outcaste soldiers into a new status category 
                                                   
39 “Yoshida Toshimaro toyū toritatekata hiki-
uke ni shite kengi ōsetsuke no koto,” in Yama-
guchi-ken shi shiryō-hen bakumatsu ishin, 6:49. 
40 “Kaki no uchi kyōsō no mono ra sashimenji 
no koto,” in Ibid., 6:50. 
41 Ibid., 6:50. 
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among the ranks of warrior menials, in much the 
same way the shogunate did with its commoner 
conscripts.  
Toshimaro’s efforts came to naught as the tur-
bulent politics of the Bakumatsu era forced a tem-
porary halt in efforts to recruit outcaste soldiers. In 
mid-1863, the Chōshū delegation to the imperial 
court was ousted from Kyoto at the instigation of a 
rival delegation from Satsuma. Rather than at-
tempting to outmaneuver Satsuma in the diplomat-
ic arena, Chōshū’s loyalist leadership launched an 
ill-advised coup attempt in the seventh month of 
1864. Several hundred men from the domain army 
attacked the Tokugawa, Satsuma, and Aizu guard 
force around the imperial palace. Chōshū forces 
were repulsed with heavy losses, and the domain 
was branded an “enemy of the court” (朝敵), as 
several musket balls had struck the interior of the 
palace compound.42  
For what would be its last effective show of 
military might, the shogunate organized a twenty-
one domain, 150,000-man punitive expedition to 
subdue the rebellious domain. With civil war 
looming, the domain’s loyalist-leaning leadership 
was replaced by a conservative faction that was 
eager to reach a peaceful accommodation with To-
kugawa negotiators. In the twelfth month of 1864, 
the domain’s new leaders agreed to disband the 
shotai—with the exception of the Senpōtai—and 
execute the leaders responsible for the failed coup 
attempt. With its mission apparently accomplished, 
the shogunal punitive force decamped without at-
tacking. As Tokugawa forces began marching 
home, Takasugi and the other mixed unit com-
manders, having disobeyed the domain’s directive 
to disband their men, attacked domain offices at 
Shimonoseki. After a brief three-month civil war, 
the shotai commanders overthrew the conservative 
faction and took the reins of the domain govern-
ment.43 
One of the new leadership’s first priorities was 
a thorough reform of the domain’s military capa-
bilities. After all, since the shotai victory in the 
domain’s civil war represented an embarrassing 
reversal of what had initially seemed like a Toku-
                                                   
42 Noguchi Takehiko, Bakufu hoheitai: baku-
matsu o kakenuketa heishi shūdan, Chūkō shinsho 
1673 (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2002), 63-68. 
43 Tanaka, 78.  
gawa political victory, it was a forgone conclusion 
that the shogunate would organize another punitive 
expedition. Under the leadership of Ōmura Masuji-
rō (formerly known as Murata Zōroku), Chōshū 
began a three-pronged military reform that in-
volved the purchase of vast quantities of updated 
weaponry, the expansion and regularization of the 
mixed units, and a gradualist reorganization of the 
main-line domain army.44 As part of the effort to 
expand the available manpower resources of the 
mixed units, domain authorities resurrected Yo-
shida Toshimaro’s plan to recruit outcaste sol-
diers.45  
The actual recruitment of outcaste soldiers 
seems to have begun in 1865, just a few months 
after the mixed units seized control of the domain 
government. Although it is unclear precisely when 
recruitment began, a later account of the Ishindan 
(維新団), the most prominent of the outcaste units, 
refers to outcastes undergoing “Western firearm 
training” (洋銃習練) from the winter—i.e., the 
ninth through twelfth months—of 1865.46 Formal 
regulations for the Ishindan’s dress and conduct 
followed in the opening month of 1866. As a result, 
it seems likely that the Ishindan and other outcaste 
units were organized in mid-1865, trained for sev-
eral months, then put into the field in the opening 
months of 1866, just before the domain’s war 
against the shogunate.  
The Ishindan was one of three outcaste units 
organized by Chōshū’s military leaders. Most of its 
soldiers hailed from an outcaste community in the 
Kumage district on the domain’s eastern border. 
The Ishindan was comprised of four platoons of 
approximately forty men each, for a total of 160 
men. 47 Although the Ishindan’s commanding of-
ficer was a commoner, many of the unit’s non-
commissioned officers hailed from the upper strata 
                                                   
44 “Gunsei kaisei ni tegumi ōsetsuke no koto,” 
in Yamaguchi-ken shi shiryō-hen bakumatsu ishin, 
6:486. 
45 Resurrecting Toshimaro was another matter; 
he had been killed in the infamous Ikedaya mas-
sacre of Chōshū loyalists that took place in Kyōto 
in 1864. 
46  “’Ishindan’ senkō shōten sata,” in Ibid., 
6:1042-1049.  
47 “Ishindan niban shōtai tai’in meibō,” in Ibid., 
6:1016-1018.  
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of the Kumage outcaste community; the unit’s first 
sergeant (惣頭取), Katsujirō, was one of the com-
munity’s elders (年寄).48 Coincidentally, it seems 
that Katsujirō’s prominence in his village was 
largely due to his involvement in the expanding 
gunpowder trade. 49  The domain also organized 
two other outcaste units: the Isshingumi (一新組) 
and the Yamashiro Chasentai (山代茶筌隊). Un-
like the Ishindan and Issingumi troopers, who 
came from communities that handled animal prod-
ucts, the Yamashiro troopers belonged to a com-
munity of chasen—a subgroup of outcastes who 
made a livelihood by manufacturing and selling 
small implements such as tea brushes (茶筌).  
Although the troopers of the Ishindan, Isshing-
umi, and Yamashiro Chasentai fought alongside 
both warriors and commoner soldiers, an array of 
physical signs set them apart from their supposed 
comrades. All of the troopers in Chōshū’s mixed 
units were required to wear shoulder patches (袖
印) listing their unit and name. At the same time 
Chōshū’s leaders organized the Ishindan, they also 
permitted the creation of peasant and townsmen 
militias, in which volunteers were allowed to serve 
as foot soldiers, despite the fact that many of these 
units were armed with antiquated weapons and 
were not intended to see frontline service.50 But 
unlike most commoner volunteers, outcaste sol-
diers were not granted the right to surname and 
sword for their term of service. As a result, the 
Ishindan troopers’ patches listed only their given 
names. Not that a casual observer would need to 
read troopers’ patches in order to distinguish them 
from commoners and warriors—troopers in the 
Ishindan, for instance, were required to wear black 
tunics, black trousers, and black bamboo hats. The 
same regulations prohibited outcaste volunteers 
from wearing fabrics made from silk or grosgrain 
                                                   
48 Nunobiki, Chōshū-han Ishindan, 78.  
49  Animal by-products like feces and bones 
were used to produce potassium nitrate, or saltpeter, 
an essential component gunpowder production. 
Despite the growing demand for these com-
modities in the Bakumatsu era, the open transport 
of animal “pollutants” caused the occasional dis-
turbance. Ibid., 73-82. 
50 “Nō shō hei kisoku no koto,” in Yamaguchi-
ken shi shiryō-hen bakumatsu ishin, 6:425-426.  
(呉絽服 ) or decorating their uniforms in any 
way.51 Using sumptuary regulations to distinguish 
outcaste volunteers from their warrior and com-
moner counterparts was one way to preserve the 
status system despite the fact that the notional sep-
aration between arms-bearers and the rest of the 
population was being transgressed in fact.52 
The singling-out of outcaste units extended be-
yond the sartorial realm, as status distinctions were 
effectively maintained in less publicly apparent 
ways. A glance at the Ishindan’s regulations re-
veals that Chōshū’s military leaders were also 
skeptical of outcastes’ abilities on the battlefield. 
While most of the Ishindan’s regulations resemble 
those of other mixed units, even those composed 
primarily of samurai, two provisions specifically 
prohibited acts of battlefield cowardice. For in-
stance, item three read:  
 
In matters of movement and tactics (進退か
け引之儀), always request [orders] from 
your superiors. As a matter of course, those 
who commit willful acts (我儘之働き), ex-
hibit cowardly behavior, or do not wait for 
the orders of their superiors will be punished 
severely.  
 
The next provision warned that “those who with-
draw before the enemy is sighted may be punished 
summarily.”53 To prevent the feared lapses in dis-
cipline, each of the outcaste units was placed under 
the command of a separate mixed unit. The Ishin-
dan was under the command of the predominantly 
samurai Yūgekitai, and the Isshingumi was under 
the Mitatetai (御楯隊). In addition, as if to empha-
size the outcaste units’ position vis-à-vis the other 
mixed units, the commanding officers of both the 
Ishindan and the Isshingumi were commoners, 
                                                   
51 “Ishindan heifuku go kikai taimei no koto,” 
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52 In this respect, the regulations echo Donald 
Shively’s contention that sumptuary regulations 
helped preserve the appearance of status distinction 
in the face of late Tokugawa social change. Donald 
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ly Tokugawa Japan,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
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whereas warriors commanded the majority of the 
mixed units. 54 Simply put, the same mixed units 
that promised social mobility to commoner and 
outcaste volunteers effectively re-constituted To-
kugawa status categories in new ways, as the pre-
recruitment status of any trooper would have been 
obvious to any of his comrades. While the use of 
commoners and outcastes as fighting men repre-
sented a significant departure from the past, life in 
the ranks was probably more like life in the village 
than soldiers had expected. 
Although a desire to secure trainable recruits 
motivated domain authorities’ decision to recruit 
from the social margins, they distrusted the loyalty 
of volunteer outcaste units that they did not organ-
ize themselves. In the first month of 1865, a chasen 
named Kinsaku attempted to contribute to 
Chōshū’s war effort by organizing his own out-
caste platoon: the thirty-man Kaminoseki Chasen-
tai (上関茶筌隊).55 How Kinsaku intended to con-
tribute to Chōshū’s auxiliary forces is unclear, but 
the unit’s training schedule was far from rigorous, 
calling for just six days of practice per month.56 
Any ambitions Kinsaku had came to naught. In 
1866, the Second Kiheitai (第二奇兵隊) arrested 
Kinsaku and his second-in-command, Tomizō, 
pending an investigation into allegations of espio-
nage. The investigation never took place. Both of 
the accused committed suicide days after their ar-
rest, though the circumstances surrounding their 
deaths were suspicious to say the least: despite 
being in custody, Kinsaku and Tomizō both ac-
quired short swords that they used to dispatch 
themselves. After the two men’s deaths, all of the 
chasen who had signed the founding oath of the 
unit were taken in for questioning by local authori-
                                                   
54 Nunobiki Toshio, “Bakumatsu Chōshū han 
hisabetsu burakumin shotai no katsudō,” Nihonshi 
kenkyū, no. 112 (May 1970), 66.  
55 Nunobiki, Chōshū han Ishindan, 113-119. 
Kinsaku’s journey had begun in 1864, when he 
traveled to Kyoto in an attempt to join the 
Shinsengumi (新撰組). After that attempt ended in 
failure, Kinsaku returned to his home village of 
Ōno, where he organized his own unit. 
56  “Kaminoseki Chasentai ketsumeigaki,” in 
Nunobiki, Chōshū han Ishindan, 198-201.  
ties.57 The Kaminoseki Chasentai’s history thus 
came to an abrupt end. 
 
War and Peace 
  
Chōshū’s outcaste soldiers saw combat for the 
first time in the summer of 1866, when Tokugawa 
forces began their second punitive expedition 
against the rebel domain. Troopers from the Ishin-
dan played a major role in repulsing the first sho-
gunal advances from their Hiroshma camp into 
Chōshū’s branch domain of Iwakuni. In fact, the 
unit’s performance on the battlefield silenced the 
jeers of its Iwakuni compatriots. During the 1866 
battle for the village of Ōno, the Ishindan lost one 
man killed and six wounded, which accounted for 
nearly one-third of Chōshū’s casualties on the 
day.58 Although casualty counts for the war lack a 
great deal of detail, it seems that a total of six out-
caste soldiers—in the Ishindan, Isshingumi, and 
Yamashiro Chasentai—died in the fighting, while 
twenty-six were wounded.59  
Although outcaste soldiers had acquitted them-
selves well on the battlefield, the domain replaced 
them with low-ranking warriors like ashigaru, 
chūgen, and rear vassals (陪臣) as soon as it was 
able. While the shotai had been fighting Tokugawa 
forces on Chōshū’s borders, the loyalist domain 
government had hurriedly re-organized the main 
body of the domain army into rifle battalions. That 
process was almost complete by the end of 1866. 
As these new units came into service, outcaste 
units were the first to be disbanded. The Yama-
shiro Chasentai was disbanded in the eighth month 
of 1866. While it is unclear when the Ishindan and 
the Isshingumi were disbanded, Nunobiki suggests 
that they most likely met the same fate soon after-
ward.60  
Chōshū eventually granted the outcaste troopers 
bonuses in recognition of their service, but only in 
1871—several years after the units were disbanded. 
Katsujirō, the Ishindan’s organizer and first ser-
                                                   
57 Ibid., 108-112.   
58  Noguchi Takehiko, Chōshū sensō, Chūkō 
shinsho 1840 (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2006), 
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geant, received the highest sum: three gold ryō, to 
be paid as five bales of rice. The unit’s other non-
commissioned officers also received between two 
and three bales of rice each, depending on their 
rank. Most soldiers received far less: seventy-five 
bales of rice to be divided among 132 men. The 
dead reaped the greatest reward. The families of 
Saikichi and Kimizō (two troopers who fell on the 
Hiroshima front) received modest stipends for life, 
as did the families of those who suffered serious 
wounds.61 However, given the timing of the bo-
nuses, it is unclear whether these “lifelong” sti-
pends continued to be disbursed after the domain’s 
dissolution. 
Did outcaste soldiers receive the abrogation of 
their status advocated in Yoshida Toshimaro’s 
original recruitment proposal? The official list of 
the troopers’ mustering-out bonuses made no men-
tion of whether any of the volunteers were granted 
the legal abrogation of their outcaste status. This 
raises two possibilities: one, that any status promo-
tion was granted in another set of documents; or 
two, that Chōshū either abandoned some of the 
recommendations outlined in Toshimaro’s pro-
posal or reneged on its promise entirely. While the 
paucity of sources precludes a definitive answer, 
the question is immaterial; once the need for non-
warrior auxiliary forces had passed, Chōshū au-
thorities took swift and decisive steps to return the 
status system in the domain to the prewar status 
quo.  
In that respect, the experience of outcaste 
troopers was a harbinger of what was to come for 
many commoner veterans. In 1869, after the coali-
tion of loyalist domains led by Satsuma and 
Chōshū successfully overthrew the shogunate, 
Chōshū embarked on a program of military re-
trenchment. The domain began dismissing com-
moners from the shotai, often with the tenuous 
justification that they had requested discharges.62 
Not all of the former soldiers went home willingly. 
The night of his discharge, Kiheitai trooper Isono 
Kumazō, the second son of a merchant in the castle 
town of Hagi, committed ritual suicide in a training 
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building within the unit’s camp. Although the 
unit’s records state that Isono killed himself to 
atone for past offenses, the timing of his actions—
in this case, the immediate aftermath of his dis-
charge—suggests at least some measure of intent 
to register disaffection with the domain’s policy.63 
Soon afterward, the domain announced plans to 
create a four-battalion regular army (常備軍) of 
2,200 men, hand-picked from its regular and irreg-
ular units.64  In the end, almost all of those select-
ed were samurai. The domain disbanded the re-
maining commoner units two weeks later.  
The decision sparked a revolt. Over a thousand 
recently unemployed soldiers from the Kiheitai—
mostly commoners—left their camp outside Ya-
maguchi and established a base at the town of 
Miyaichi. 65  With the prospect of promotion to 
warrior status off the table, these disaffected veter-
ans began petitioning the domain government to 
redress the unfairness of the regular army selection 
process.66 The mutineers’ ranks soon swelled to 
two thousand. After the veterans crushed an all-
samurai force organized by the domain govern-
ment, the Meiji government intervened. In March 
of 1870, a force commanded by Kido Takayoshi 
arrived in Chōshū and defeated the rebels in less 
than a week. The remaining soldiers dispersed; 
some tried to return home, while others fled to 
neighboring domains. Chōshū, however, had no 
intention of letting the matter drop; it appointed 
investigators to track down fleeing rebels.67 Do-
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main authorities also investigated the households 
of former soldiers suspected of participating in the 
revolt, as well as any reports of peasants wearing 
swords.68 Similar, though less violent, phenomena 
occurred in other localities in 1869, as domains and 
prefectures alike tried to restrict commoner volun-
teers’ attempts to exercise the rights to surname 
and sword.69 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both outcaste and commoner volunteers joined 
Chōshū’s war effort in search of some kind of so-
cial mobility. For commoners, that may have 
meant pursuing the prospect of employment as a 
warrior menial. For most outcastes, mobility may 
have meant the potential abrogation of their sta-
tus—at least on an individual level. The political 
and military crisis of the Bakumatsu era led the 
shogunate and reformist domains to use the inher-
ent elasticity in the Tokugawa status system to em-
ploy commoners—and in Chōshū’s case, out-
castes—as fighting men. But when the crisis faded, 
domains like Chōshū moved quickly to close the 
                                                                             
units and veterans they were able to identify. Sid-
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Diary of Kido Takayoshi (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1983), 1:326. 
68
 “Dattaisotsu kyodō no kyōbōsha todokedashi 
no koto,” “Moto dattaisotsu no uchi fukokoroe nite 
taitō haikaisha torishimari no koto,” Ibid., 6:927, 
932.  
69 In 1869, for instance, a group of rusticated 
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protested when they were not offered military 
employment. Meiji leaders quelled the nascent 
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behavior. Senda Minoru, Ishin seiken no 
chokuzoku guntai (Tokyo: Kaimei Shoin, 1978), 23. 
The following year, officials in Kumihama 
prefecture complained to the Ministry of Civil 
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Kumihama-ken, “Nōmin taitō no gi ni tsuki 
ukagai” (Kōbunroku 2A-9-36-41, National 
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narrow avenues of social mobility they had opened. 
Not that it mattered in the end. When the status 
system was legally abolished by the Meiji govern-
ment between 1869 and 1871, the social context 
that gave meaning to commoner and outcaste vet-
erans’ mobility disappeared. While the 1873 Con-
scription Ordinance eventually opened up a differ-
ent military path to social mobility, elements of the 
Tokugawa status system persisted even in the early 
years of the modern, conscript army. This was par-
ticularly true for outcastes, according to Yamagata 
Aritomo’s biographer: 
 
From the moment the Conscription Ordi-
nance was promulgated, Duke [Yamagata] 
gave sufficient attention to the former XX 
[eta] and XX [hinin], who were now the 
same as commoners. Because many from 
that group were engaged customarily in 
leatherworking and were well practiced in 
the treatment [of leather], when they con-
scripted and assigned to active duty, they 
were made cobblers and assigned to the 
mending and production of the shoes used 
in the military.70 
 
In other words, outcastes had been emancipated 
so that their sons could be conscripted by the state 
to perform the same trades their ancestors had. For 
outcastes, at least, social mobility proved largely 
illusory in both the experimental military forces of 
the Bakumatsu era and in the early Meiji army. 
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